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ATT: Gary La Valley 
USNA 
589 McNair Blvd. 
Annapolis, MD 31402-5029 
Dear Gary, 
3913 Arroyo Seco 
Schertz, TX 78154 
August 1, 2001 
I have enclosed the transcript of the oral history interview that I conducted with 
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, USN (Ret.), USNA '52. I have also inclosed a copy of the 
release for the interview signed by Captain Hughes. To help make the interview more 
useful, I have included a couple of things that Captain Hughes mentioned during his 
interview. 






Colonel, USAF, (Ret.) 
ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW 
Know that I, Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret) have participated 
in an Oral history interview with Colonel Paul T. Ringen.bach, USAF( Ret.) on June 1, 
2001. It contains my best recollection of events and experiences, which may be of 
historical significance to the USAF A and the USAF. 
I do hereby voluntarily give, transfer, convey and assign all right, title and interest 
in the memoirs recorded on audio cassette tapes or transcriptions to the United States Air 
Force Academy, acting on behalf of the United States of America, to have and to hold the 
same forever, hereby relinquishing for myself, my executors, administrators, heirs and 
assigns all ownership, right, title, and interest therein to the USAF A. 
I understand that all of these tapes and transcribed manuscripts resulting 
this interview will be considered public records, open to inspection by anyone requesting 
Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., USN (Ret.) interviewed by 
Colonel Paul T. Ringenbach, USAF (Ret.) June 1, 2001 
PR I'd like you to tell me about your own background and how you ended up at the 
Naval Academy. 
WH I was a 1952 graduate of the Naval Academy. About in 1955, I wrote an article and 
sent it off to the Naval Institute, but it was not published in its Proceedings. In it, I said 
there were only two kinds of graduates - - those who never want to see the place again 
and those who want to come back and straighten out the Naval Academy. The Institute 
passed it over to Rear Admiral William Smedberg who was the Superintendent of the 
Naval Academy. He was trying to reform the curriculum. You probably have a sense of 
that from my Shipmate_article. The study-recite, 19th Century Academy curriculum and 
perspective was how the school functioned. He asked the Institute not to publish the 
article, but the Naval Institute paid me for it anyway. He then wrote to me and told me 
that it was time for me to put up and shut up so come back to the Academy for your next 
tour of duty. I had put in for post graduate school and so I withdrew that application and 
got orders to the Academy. 
PR When did you actually get to the Academy? 
WH It was the summer of 1957. I taught naval history and. diplomatic history part-time 
and I worked part-time under Captain Anton 'Tony" Gallaher. He was the Secretary of 
the Academic Board which was the equivalent of the Dean of Academic Programs. In 
fact, the title was later changed to something like that. The Secretary of the Academic 
Board and Admiral Smedberg really couldn't get the Academic Board to do anything 
drastic. I guess I wrote about this too. It was a case where 12 strong-willed people were 
timid in changing what was supposedly a proven system of academics. The Air Force 
connection is, somewhere about then, in 1958 probably, I went out to the Air Force 
Academy and was briefed on the Air Force Academy program. It was very much - - I 
blush to say now, I loved it because it had courses in philosophy and ethics. My take on 
the Naval Academy was that we were too engineering-oriented and we needed more of 
that kind of social sciences and humanities. I would not say that any more, but that was 
my belief at the time. So I was most impressed with the Air Force curriculum. By then, I 
guess they had moved up from Lowry because I visited the new plant at Colorado 
Springs. 
PR Were you the Assistant Secretary of the Academic Board at that time? 
WH That's right. That was my title. I was just a lieutenant working for a captain. As 
Assistant Secretary I was involved in a lot of routine stuff such as getting failing students 
ready to appear to have their academic standing reviewed - - to see whether to discharge 
them or turn them back to the next class. There was a civilian who was a professional 
academic. He was an advisor and he was also terribly conservative. He wasn't 
conservative as far as the indoctrination of the plebes in Bancroft Hall was concerned, 
but he wanted to eliminate some of what he called hazing. Some of it was hazing, but it 
was "good for us." He wanted to reform the academic programs too. I don't recall his 
name. Nothing happened. Next year, Smedberg moved on to become Chief of Naval 
Personnel. I think he may have relieved Admiral Holloway. Holloway had conceived of 
the Holloway Plan for Naval ROTC to supplement the regular corps. This is the CNO' s 
father, J.L. Holloway, Jr. So Smedberg left and Rear Admiral Charles L. Melson became 
the new Superintendent. He was an austere, cold man who was difficult to get close to as 
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opposed to Smedberg who was very warm and friendly. Melson came in and terrorized 
the Academic Board, but he was also frustrated and couldn't get anything done. 
PR Your article said that Melson added non-credit, voluntary courses in the evening. 
WH That could be - - in the 58-59 time frame. But, there was no break in the lock-step 
curriculum yet. Then Gallaher went back to sea and a new Secretary of the Academic 
Board arrived, Captain William D. Brinkloe. He was extraordinary because he was an 
EDO. He came in with an opposite view on the nature of the reforms from me, and 
frankly, he was right. He wanted to strengthen the engineering programs. He wanted to 
get away from things like the study of the boilers that a technical school would teach. He 
wanted to teach more of the theory of thermodynamics, heat transfer and fluid mechanics. 
Well, that was possible within the framework that existed. He was first the chairman of 
the Marine Engineering department and started to do that in his department. Then 
Melson saw him as forceful and knowledgeable and brought him up to be Secretary of 
the Academic Board. Then things started to happen because this side of the curriculum 
was now actually being charged. We still had the lock-step curriculum however, where 
everyone took the same subjects. But the subjects now were taught more like an 
undergraduate college program in engineering. There was a lot of talk at the time about 
how we could give the cadets more social sciences and humanities which was my slant 
and the civilian's. Also we could teach less in a prep-school way, not with weekly 
grades, but let the teachers teach like college teachers. This was exceedingly popular 
with the faculty, but they did not want to give up anything. Something had to give in 
order for the curriculum to get more flexible. Two things happened. Brinkloe persuaded 
the Superintendent who persuaded the Academic Board to go for electives and validation. 
It was at that time that I wrote memo to the Superintendent that said two things. One, as 
soon as you have validation, you're going to have third classmen going to class with 
plebes and even second class cadets going to school with plebes. And the whole concept 
of discipline as we know it will change. There's no way you can march to class. You 
can't march in cohorts because the cadets will be all mixed up. That is going to 
revolutionize not only the academic program, but also the whole system of discipline. I 
did not say that this was a bad thing, but I did say that this would be inevitable. It was an 
internal memorandum from me to the Superintendent. It's somewhere in the files. 
Professors John A Fitzgerald and Roger D. Little who were writing something about the 
Academy ran across it and talked to me a bit about it. They published an article on the 
USNA curriculum and faculty. There is another peculiar thing that I published in a 
Shipmate, our alumni magazine, - - well maybe I can dig that out for you. The most 
boring thing that I did of all three articles was the one in the Proceedings because that 
was sort of the party line. It was okay and all true, but not very catchy like the Shipmate 
article was. The Shipmate article by the way, I had written a year and a half earlier than 
it was published, because the Superintendent, Admiral Melson, wouldn't allow me to 
publish it until after he left. Meanwhile, Brinkloe, as Secretary of the Academic Board 
introduced validation and electives. The first thing, then was pointing out the effect on 
the non-academic side of Naval Academy, discipline and moral, and the whole system in 
Bancroft Hall. The second thing I said to the Superintendent was that we had an 
organization that made it very difficult to change the curriculum. (I think there was a 
flavor of this in one of the two articles.) This was the power of the Academic Board. 
The Superintendent had one vote and the 12 members of the Academic Board had one 
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vote each. They would look around and see if they had a majority and they would vote 
for "no change." So the new proposed structure had divisions. There would be 4 
divisions, each headed by a captain, in which the departments would reside. Each of 
these division heads would have one vote and the Superintendent would have 3 votes. 
Then he sent this reorganization, which had to be approved by the Navy, over to Admiral 
Smedberg along with an explanation of why he wanted to do this. When that was 
approved, then the door was open. From that grew validation, electives, and majors. 
That was about the time that I left in 1960. Oh, one other thing that was pertinent. 
Brinkloe was very capable and after a year, he moved. Then Captain John Victor Smith 
came. Smith was the son of Holland Smith. Victor Smith had a different personality 
from the Marine General but he was just as forceful. He had been the head of the 
Ordnance and Gunnery Department and he had been one of the old guard. He was 
extremely reluctant to modernize ordnance and gunnery which was also more like a 
training program than an education in the fundamentals of ordnance. Well, Melson did a 
brilliant thing. He brought him up and made him the Secretary of the Academic Board, 
under his thumb, and gave him the responsibility of executing the new plans that were 
coming along. So with or without his heart in it, Smith got behind the Melson initiatives. 
One thing he was very good at was wheeling and dealing, and as chief of staff, as you 
will, he was perfect for the job. Besides being Assistant Secretary, I worked in the 
Superintendent's office part of the time, and spent about 1/3 of my 3 years teaching in the 
Department of English, History, and Government. 
PR At that time did you have a Master's degree? 
WH No, I did not. To illustrate the changes that were afoot, when I went to the post-
graduate school to take Operations Research as a Master's degree, there were 5 or 6 
graduates who went back to the Academy to teach Operations Research. By then, there 
was a move to require the officer instructors to have Master's degrees. The ops research 
officers wrote the textbook and began a very fine course in Operations Research. It was 
very popular and one of the majors. The Math Dept. hated it because nobody was taking 
a Math Major. Everyone was taking Ops Research which had some math in it. It was 
real world and practical. Eventually, the Math Dept. persuaded a Superintendent to fold 
the Ops Research major into the Math Department. The Math Dept then ruled supreme -
- but that's just on aside. 
PR The first article in I 955, you wrote on your own. On the other two articles, were you 
encouraged to write them? 
WH The one for the Proceedings, the Superintendent asked me to write to explain what 
we were doing. The Superintendent was under a lot of heat from the fleet for wanting to 
change the system. The retired graduates felt that they survived the Academy system and 
the war, so they didn't see any reason to change. They didn't realize that education had 
progressed a lot since they went through it. So the article was to explain the substance of 
the changes and a little of the rationale. The one that I thought was a kick, and far more 
forceful was the one in Shipmate. As I said before, Melson didn't want that one to go out 
because he was more politically astute than I was. He had more sense of the old guard 
and how to win them. 
PR In reading all this material and trying to break away, it looks like at all 3 service 
academies there was a tremendous inertia to leave things as they were. Everything was 
fine, we all did great, we're all admirals or generals and we don't need to change 
anything. 
WH That's precisely right. 
PR This was true at the Air Force Academy too because most of the early leaders there 
were West Pointers. McDermott was fighting all this. Before he even got to the Air 
Force Academy he sold Harmon on the idea of the instructors having a Master's degree 
in the specialty that they taught. The Air Force ended up with 83% of the initial 
instructor cadre' with Master's degrees which was way above the other 2 academies. 
During the initial days of the Academy, some officers from the sister service academies 
went to Colorado to get briefed. You mentioned that you were one. I was wondering 
how much of this feedback from visitors like yourself was useful in helping overturn the 
traditionalism at the Naval Academy. Dean Drought was another such visitor who later 
credited McDermott with his assistance in this. 
WH I do think that there was something of a two-way street. They could compare and 
see what was working and what wasn't. In so far as my visit was concerned, I can't 
remember. I liked the Naval Academy system that was predominately civilian, who all 
had Master's degrees and many Ph.D.s. When I went to the Air Force Academy, I 
believed that the West Point-Air Force military faculty system was inferior to ours, so I 
didn't pay much attention. It never occurred to me at the time about the need to upgrade 
the military instructors. My objection was that because the military instructors stayed 
many years at West Point, many were like civilians in uniform. In Annapolis during 
1957- 1960, all department chairmen were Navy captains. All number two's were Navy 
commanders. Then there would be some sort of recognized senior civilian who was 
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something of an advisor. All these individuals didn't teach at all and that was very 
similar to what you described to me about West Point. On the other hand, the military 
would only serve at the Academy for 2 or 3 years and then they would go back to line 
duty. 
PR I read somewhere that in the summer of 1959 the USNA put in an extensive elective 
program. Midshipmen could take these classes for those that had been validated. 
WH That was the Brinkloe effect. 
PR Also they could take extra courses over and above the standard curriculum, if their 
grades were good. 
WH We made the decisions in 1958 which were initiated in 1959. That was what broke 
the dam and allowed majors. Later on, the majors were built into the curriculum. When 
the whole system started in 1959, it was really intended for the top students or those who 
had had some college. But it didn't break the lockstep. The next thing that happened was 
the majors program in the early 1960s. 
PR There were 2 or 3 articles that came out in the 1959 time frame-Time, etc. in part 
they were generated by the first Air Force Academy class graduating. The articles talked 
about the Air Force Academy curriculum being more education than training and the split 
between the sciences vs. the social sciences and the humanities. The title of the article 
was "last week the Army and the Navy turned in the same direction." While there may 
have been no direct lift, the Air Force Academy was newer and had changed. This gave 
Army and Navy a chance to see another system working. 
WH I believe that. What I remember was that the core curriculum had much more 
liberal arts than at the Naval Academy. I admired it greatly. Here's another factor. After 
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graduation, the Air Force Academy sent their officers either to flight school or advanced 
education. Our surface officers went directly to ships. So the pattern was to give them 
enough basics of systems, ordnance, marine propulsion, navigation, electronics, weather, 
etc. to serve in their first ship. But only a small fraction of graduates went to ships. 
Those who went into aviation, the Marine Corps, the Supply Corps, or submarines all had 
extensive additional schooling. Later changes gave more theoretical work. 
PR It was really a shift from preparing a cadet for his duty assigmnent to preparing a 
cadet for a career. 
WH That's exactly right. We were getting so diverse, however, that if we'd done that 
we'd have chosen Marines after 2 years and had a separate Marine indoctrination at the 
Academy. But we didn't. We made the decision for a career in the last semester of the 
last year. 
PR It reflects that the leadership of the Navy were line officers of the fleet and the Naval 
Academy prepared the officers well for what they considered to be the right thing. They 
didn't think about all the rest of the requirements of the fleet and of the Navy. 
WH That's true. 
PR They were focusing in on what they considered to be the core of the Navy. To them, 
the real important part of the Navy was being taken care of with the current system so 
why do we have to change anything? 
WH That's right. You've got it right. 
PR It's kind of an amazing story of how the academies were able to overcome so much 
tradition and conservatism. 
Q 
WH On the one hand it is amazing that we were so slow in doing it. On the other hand it 
was amazing that we finally broke through. I think that the very fact that the Air Force 
Academy had been created and was doing things differently, even if we did not know 
precisely what, gave us an incentive. Those who knew that this was happening at the Air 
Force Academy had an incentive to try to change. It was our impression at the time that 
they were not only going to teach more liberal and more fundamental education, but they 
would teach it in a more college-like fashion. 
PR I ran into an article in the New York Times in 58 or 59 that talked about numbers of 
applications. In that particular year, the number of applications for the Air Force 
Academy was far greater than West Point and Annapolis. The article was raising the 
question of why? I think one reason was different basic admissions systems. The other 
implication of the article was that the Air Force Academy was looking academically 
more like a regular college, offering electives, etc. and this was more attractive to 
prospective students. 
WH Don't overlook that flying was a sexy choice. But, I think that the Air Force 
Academy had a more mature-looking academic program. 
PR I wouldn't like to try to use ops research techniques to look at this type of data. 
WH No, it's pretty subtle and subjective. So McDermott, you say, was forward looking 
and decisive and had the power to make the changes? 
PR He eventually got the power, but first worked behind General Harmon. The first 
Dean was transferred. He got a negative recommendation from the accreditation folks. 
~ The accreditation issue is another curiosity. We gave a Bachelor of Science degree. 
We wanted to be engineering-accredited. It was a big deal to get an engineering 
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accreditation and, Brinkloe wanted that. That was another of the reasons that we had to 
reform the way we taught. We did have such an intensive program we could squeeze it in 
eventually for engineering majors. 
PR The Air Force Academy also sought that engineering accreditation. 
WH I think the third academy probably created a more obvious need for the academy 
Superintendents to get together regularly to coordinate. Both Smedberg and Melson 
wanted to make changes, but they weren't sure what. I think that Brinkloe deserves the 
lion's share of credit for showing what could be done and breaking the dam. He was the 
only Secretary not to be a sea-going line officer. 
PR One Navy Admiral said something to McDermott that he was unhappy about the 
validation of courses, etc. because it would mess up the graduation order of merit. He 
said that McDermott may not know what this meant for the Navy, but the ships at sea 
proceeded by the graduate order of merit of the commanding officers. 
WH That was the old guard talking. Your class standing determined the lineal order of 
when you graduated. If you were one place ahead of the other guy, and you went to sea, 
and you were both captains, then the one who was higher in class standing at the time of 
graduation was the tactical commander, and senior in command. But that was more 
important in, say, 1900, than in 1950 because most graduates served in ships. 
PR Are you still teaching? 
WH I teach twice a year at the Naval Postgraduate School and advise thesis students. 
Military graduate students are mature and we pay them so they don't have to moonlight 
to make ends meet. There are no better students to teach, anywhere. 
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PR It looks to like you had a significant input on change at the Naval Academy when 
you were there because of your articles and your position. 
WH For a young lieutenant, I was in the right place at the right time. Believe it or not, 
in all this I was pretty cautious and conservative. Bill Brinkloe knew what to do. I just 
could see good ideas when they were visible and nudge and encourage. 
n! Bul it also looks like you had the respect of the three Superintendents and the 
Academic Dean. Also being closer to the graduates, being the Class of 1952, you 
probably wielded influence way out of proportion to your rank and your status. The 
Supt. did ask you to write the article and did send you to the Air Force Academy to see 
what was going on. 
~ I didn't think of it that way at the time, but maybe they did listen. It was a great 
place to be at the right time. If you need anymore, or want to review the bidding, I think 
you have my NPS phone numbers. 
PR What I'll do is get this transcribed and get your changes. Then it will go into the Air 
Force Academy archives. 
WH I hope that you will share this with the Naval Academy too. I will also see ifI can 
locate the 1955 article. 
PR I will absolutely. Thank you very much for your time. 
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